王金秋1，袁红平2

（1.中铁南方投资集团有限公司产业新城事业部，深圳518000；2.广州大学工商管理学院，广州510006）

摘　要：在PPP项目中，政府与社会资本不同的风险态度会对公私双方期望收益产生影响。基于委托代理理论，引入政府对社会资本的激励与惩罚函数，设计了一个包含政府激励和监督的最优激励监督契约；基于参与约束与激励相容原理建立了政府期望收益最大化的委托代理模型。分析发现：PPP项目中的政府激励与监督是有效的，社会资本努力水平与政府激励水平和监督力度均成正相关；政府可以通过激励和监督引导社会资本采取更高努力水平；当政府为风险规避时，政府愿意通过提供更高的激励水平来促使社会资本努力工作；而当社会资本为风险规避时，政府将降低激励水平减少社会资本的收益分成。政府监督力度存在一个最优值，能更好地促使社会资本努力工作。

关键词：PPP项目；激励与监督；委托代理；风险态度

中图分类号：F283文献标识码：A

An Incentive and Supervision Model Considering the Risk Attitude of both Public and Private Parties in PPP Project(www.daowen.com)

WANG Jinqiu1，YUAN Hongping2

（1.Industrial New Town Business Unit，China Railway Southern Investment Group Co.，LTD，Shenzhen 518000，P.R.China；2.School of Management，Guangzhou University，Guangzhou 510006，P.R.China）

Abstract：In PPP projects，the different risk attitudes of the government and private investorswill have an impact on the expected earnings of both.Based on the principal-agent theory，we introduced the incentive and punishment functions of private investors，designed an optimal contract with government incentives and supervision，and established the principal-agent model based on the principle of participation constraint and incentive compatibility.The analysis finds that the government incentives and supervision in PPP projects are effective，and the level of private investors’efforts is positively correlated with the level of government incentive and supervision.The government can guide private investors to higher levels of effort through incentives and supervision.When the government is risk-averse，the government is willing to encourage private investors to work hard by offering higher incentives.When private investors are risk-averse，the government will reduce incentives to reduce the share of private investors’profits.There is an optimal level of government supervision thatwould better encourage private investors to work harder.

Keywords：PPP project；incentives and supervision；principal-agent；risk attitudes