理论教育 角色反转:成员执行WTO裁决的强有力对价

角色反转:成员执行WTO裁决的强有力对价

时间:2023-05-27 理论教育 版权反馈
【摘要】:因为,尽管事实上一个成员方可能会为了避免被认定为“无视法律者”而选择执行WTO裁决,同时也会考虑在将来的某个案件中自己可能作为胜诉方时的角色反转的情况。需要特别指出的是,当争端发生在两个具有相对一致性的经济实力和贸易额的成员之间时,如美国和欧盟,角色反转作为一个对执行WTO裁决的考虑经常是一项强而有力的对价。对执行WTO裁决的全过程进行多边监督。

角色反转:成员执行WTO裁决的强有力对价

作为执行WTO裁决的一个影响因素,“角色反转”经常被视为是一个补充因素〔100〕。因为,尽管事实上一个成员方可能会为了避免被认定为“无视法律者”而选择执行WTO裁决,同时也会考虑在将来的某个案件中自己可能作为胜诉方时的角色反转的情况。需要特别指出的是,当争端发生在两个具有相对一致性的经济实力和贸易额的成员之间时,如美国和欧盟,角色反转作为一个对执行WTO裁决的考虑经常是一项强而有力的对价。然而,当两个成员之间存在较大经济实力或贸易额上的差距时,情况则会有所不同。在这样的情况下,经济实力较弱的成员方即使胜诉也会损失更多[105]

综上所述,WTO裁决及其执行机制与整个争端解决机制甚至WTO多边贸易体制的各个环节有着千丝万缕的关系,“牵一发而动全身”,共同构成一个动态系统工程

WTO裁决事实上为败诉方政府提供了实施国内政策改革时说服民众的一种工具和证据,这一点在客观上促使成员执行WTO裁决,有助于推动成员国(地区)内改革,保持与WTO承诺和义务的一致性。通过考察可以看出一个趋势,即专家组或上诉机构作出的裁决越明确,执行起来就越容易,也就是说,模棱两可的裁决往往会使裁决执行较难操作,甚至会引起更多的争议。

WTO裁决执行必然是困难和复杂的。一是所有WTO争端案件都会在不同程度上有“争议”,如果没有争议,WTO成员就没有必要诉诸WTO争端解决机制。二是执行裁决不可避免地涉及国内有关产业的“结构调整”。因此,执行措施在国内有争议,或必须进行“结构调整”,都不是要求获得更长的合理期限的理由。

因此,WTO为其裁决执行制定了一系列规则和程序。该机制集政治、法律与经济手段为一体,由三个方面构成:(1)司法体系。由专家组或上诉机构对执行裁决的合理期限、执行过程中发生的异议,以及报复水平进行仲裁。(2)行政体系。对执行WTO裁决的全过程进行多边监督。(3)救济体系。允许自愿补偿,即通过经济手段纠正由于违法措施导致的争端方之间权利与义务的失衡,以及允许在不执行WTO裁决的情况下作为最后手段,授权胜诉方对败诉方实施报复措施。执行体制中的司法程序是WTO中的新生事物。专家组和上诉机构在裁决执行阶段依法对诸如执行最后期限、执行异议,以及报复水平等一系列争议作出独立、公正、具有约束力的裁定,反映了WTO司法管辖权延伸到执行裁决阶段,再次凸显了WTO的“法治观念”,而这种带有司法性质的执行程序在其他国际组织中并不多见。

【注释】

〔1〕在WTO争端案件中,采取的措施被认为违反WTO协定而被起诉至DSB,最终裁定措施违规而应执行裁决的成员方在整个案件中的不同阶段可以被称为“被申请方”“被诉方”“被申诉方”“被报复方”等,为了不因同一当事方的不同名称导致混淆,本书统一称之为“败诉方”,同理,对方当事方统一称之为“胜诉方”,特此说明。

〔2〕胡建国.WTO争端解决裁决执行机制研究.北京:人民出版社,2011:78.

〔3〕Won-Mog Choi.To Comply or Not to Comply?-Non-implementation Problems in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.Journal of World Trade,2007,41(5):1043.

〔4〕John Jackson.Dispute Settlement and the WTO:Background Note for Conference on Developing Countries and the New Round Multilateral of Trade Negotiations.New York:Harvard University Press,1999:58.

〔5〕傅星国.WTO争端裁决的执行机制.上海:上海人民出版社,2011:27.

〔6〕Jide Nzelibe.The Credibility Imperative:The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism.Theoretical Inquiries in Law,2005,6(1):215.

〔7〕Joel P.Trachtman.Building the WTO Cathedral.Stanford Journal of International Law,2007,43(2):14.

〔8〕John Jackson.The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation.American Journal of International of Law,1997,91(4):62.

〔9〕John Jackson.The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding;Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation.91 American Journal of International Law,1997,65(7):60.

〔10〕Frieder Roessler.Performance of The System IV:Implementation,Comments,The International Lawyer.New York:Int'l Law Press,1998:789.

〔11〕Petros C.Mavroidis.Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and Hard Place.European JIL,2000,11(5):534.

〔12〕Geert A.Zonnekeyn.The Legal Status of WTO Panel Reports in the EC Legal Order,Some Reflections on the Opinion of Advocate General Mishicho in the Atlanta Case.Journal of International Economic Law,1999,71(3):721.

〔13〕See International Law Association London Conference(2000),Fourth Report of the Committee,Committee On International Trade Law,para.30.

〔14〕The Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages,WT/DS 8,10,11/AB/R,adopted on 1 November 1996,p.14.

〔15〕本书中,对不执行裁决应做广义的解释,即包括执行措施不符合裁决、拖延执行和拒不执行裁决等情况。

〔16〕See Article 21.1 of the DSU.

〔17〕Beth A.Simmons.Compliance with International Agreements.Review of Political Science,1998,75(8):798.

〔18〕See Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary.

〔19〕See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary(5th ed),Oxford University Press.

〔20〕《法律词典》,北京:法律出版社2003:1895.

〔21〕顾婷.国际公法视域下的WTO法.北京:北京大学出版社,2010:37.

〔22〕参见联合国文件:A/CN4/448,《各国政府提出的关于国家责任的评论和意见》(爱尔兰政府的评论)。

〔23〕[美]约翰·H.杰克逊.GATT/WTO法理与实践.张玉卿等译,北京:新华出版社,2002:202.

〔24〕John H.Jackson.The WTO Dispute Settlement-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation.American Journal of International Law,1997,91:60-63.

〔25〕John H.Jackson.International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:Obligation to Comply or Option to“Buy Out”?.The American Journal of International Law,2004,98(1):123-125.

〔26〕Petros C.Mavroidis.Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and a Hard Place.European Journal of International Law,2000,11:782.

〔27〕John H.Jackson.The WTO Dispute Settlement-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation.American Journal of International Law,1997,91:62.

〔28〕Carlos M.Vazquez,John H.Jackson.Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions,Law and Policy in International Business.Law&Pol'y Int'l Bus,2002,67:565.

〔29〕WT/DS46/ARB,para.3.42.

〔30〕WT/DS60/R,para.8.2.

〔31〕本书只讨论狭义的执行。

〔32〕WT/DS136/R,para.6.292.

〔33〕DSU共分为3部分规定了WTO争端解决裁决执行机制的主要内容。

〔34〕WT/DS60/R,para.8.2.

〔35〕WT/DS136/R,para.6.292.

〔36〕Fatoumata Jawara,Aileen Kwa.Behind the Scenes at the WTO:the real world of international trade negotiation.London:Zed Books,2005:5.

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〔38〕John Austin.The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.NY:Prometheus Books,2000:141-142.

〔39〕Nathaniel Berman.The Paradoxes of Legitimacy:Case Studies in International Legal Modernism.32 Harvard International Law Journal,1991,29:583.

〔40〕Louis Henkin.How Nation Behave:Law and Foreign Policy.New York:Columbia University Press,1979:47.

〔41〕Petros C.Mavroidis.Remedies in the WTO Legal System:Between a Rock and Hard Place.European JIL,2000,11:782.

〔42〕Shabtai Rosenne.The World Court:What It Is and How It Works.Marinus Nijhoff Pbulishers,1995:42-43.

〔43〕Award of the Arbitrator under Article 21.3(c),US-Offset Act(Byrd Amendment),para.69.

〔44〕Boutros-Ghali.A Grotian Moment.18 Fordham International Law Journal,1995,17:1609.

〔45〕何志鹏.国际法的遵从机制探究.东方法学,2009(9):48.

〔46〕张玉卿.WTO案例精选:WTO热点问题荟萃.北京:中国商务出版社,2015:9.

〔47〕徐昕,张磊.WTO争端解决机制的法理.上海:上海三联书店出版社,2011:45-46.

〔48〕本书会交替使用欧共体或欧盟,特此说明。(www.daowen.com)

〔49〕胡建国.美欧执行WTO裁决的比较分析——以国际法遵守为视角.欧洲研究.2014(1):102.

〔50〕谭观福.WTO争端解决中国败诉案执行法律问题探析.上海对外经贸大学学报.2016(4):68.

〔51〕Hudec,Robert E.International Economic Law:The Political Theatre Dimension,17 University of Pennsylvania J.of International Economic Law,1996:9–15.Hudec,Robert E.The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview of the First Three Years,8 Minnesota J.of Global Trade,1999:26.

〔52〕Petersmann,Ernst-Ulrich.Reforming the World Trading System:Rule-Making,Trade Negotiations,and Dispute Settlement,Oxford:Oxford Univ.Press,2005:178.这种策略就显得特别有效。在棉花案件中以及EC-Sugar[European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar,complaint by Brazil(DS266)].See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm(2019 4 30).

〔53〕Petersmann,Ernst-Ulrich.WTO Negotiators Meet Academics:The Negotiations on Improvements of the WTO Dispute Settlement System,6 J.of International Economic Law,2003:237.Odell,John S.Negotiating the World Economy,Ithaca,NY:Cornell Univ.Press,2000:125.Weekes,John M.The External Dynamics of the Dispute Settlement Understanding:An Initial Analysis of Its Impact on Trade Relations and Trade Negotiations,Presented at Conference on International Trade and Dispute Settlement,Montevideo,Uruguay,15 April,2004.Davis,Christina L.Food Fights Over Free Trade:How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization,Princeton,NJ:Princeton Univ.Press,2003:96.

〔54〕Galanter,Marc.Why the‘Haves’Come Out Ahead:Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,9 Law&Society Rev,1974:95.

〔55〕Joseph A.Conti.The Good Case:Decisions to Litigate at the World Trade Organization,Law&Society Review,2008,42(1):175.

〔56〕因此本书主要以美国、欧盟和中国三个主要WTO成员的执行实践为研究对象。

〔57〕Louis Henkin.How Nation Behave:Law and Foreign Policy(2nd.ed).New York:Columbia University Press,1979:47.

〔58〕Louis Henkin's famous phrase,“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time.”Louis Henkin.How Nations Behave.F.A.Praeger,1968:42.

〔59〕WT/DS/OV/34,3 June 2010.

〔60〕韩立余.入世对中国法治的影响.中国青年政治学院学报,2011(5):117.

〔61〕Yang Guohua,“China in the WTO Dispute Settlement:A Memoir”,Journal of World Trade,2015,49(1):11.

〔62〕Joost Pauwelyn.Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach.The American Journal of International Law,2000,94(2):335.

〔63〕于洋,张辉.WTO争端解决执行异议诉讼的趋势.WTO经济导刊,2015(7):90.

〔64〕本书介绍美国和欧盟WTO裁决执行情况一方面是因为它们是WTO中最大的两个成员方,另一方面是目前WTO实践中几起不执行的典型案件大多涉及这两个成员方,具有代表性。关于两个成员的裁决执行制度分析详见第二章介绍,关于中国执行WTO裁决的情况,将在第五章予以介绍。

〔65〕Louis Henkin.How Nations Behave(2nd ed).Columbia University Press,1979:48.

〔66〕Robert Hudec.The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy.Butterworth Legal Publisher,1990:468.

〔67〕有关中国的WTO裁决执行案件具体情况详见第四章。

〔68〕本案应于2011年3月19日到期,事实上2012年4月15日签订《中美电影协议》而结案。

〔69〕The Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law&Justice,WTO Obligations are bilateral obligations.http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/02/020101-01.html(2019 4 30).

〔70〕包括现实主义、制度主义、规范主义和自由主义等流派。

〔71〕有关国际法遵守理论的系统阐述,详见Markus Burgstaller.Theories of Compliance with International Law,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2005.

〔72〕John Magnus.Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions:Is There a Crisis?.http://www.tradewinsllc.net/publi/DS%20Book%20Chapter%2010-05.pdf(2019-4-28).

〔73〕[美]博登海默.法理学:法律哲学与法律方法.邓正来译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2004:177.

〔74〕Thomas M.Franck.Legitimacy in the International System.American Journal of International Law,2002(82):706.

〔75〕James McCall Smith.The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design:Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.International Law,2000,54(1):142.

〔76〕19 U.S.C.3512(a)(2)(2000).

〔77〕Robert E.Hudec.Enforcing International Trade Law.Salem:Butterworth,1991:172.

〔78〕Julian G.Ku.The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations:New Problems With Old Solutions.MINN.Law Review,2000:77.

〔79〕卢建祥.WTO裁决的强制执行机制.上海:华东政法大学,2008:103.

〔80〕国际法规则能否在欧盟产生直接的法律效力,欧洲法院确定的一般标准是:1.该规则的内容是否足够清楚、准确;2.根据国际法的上下文和目的,判定该规则是否符合国际法的目的,详见Case 270/80,Polydor Ltd.V.Harlequin Record Shops Ltd.,1982 E.C.R.329;Case C-149/96,The Queen v.Minister of Agric,Fisheries and Food,1994 E.C.R.I-3087等。

〔81〕John H.Jackson.The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation.The American Journal of International Law,2001,91(1):60.

〔82〕John H.Jackson.The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO:Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations(2nd ed).New York:High Education Press,2002:163.

〔83〕Shabtai Rosenne.The World Court,What It Is and How It Words(5th ed).Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1995:42.

〔84〕Award of the Arbitrator under Article 21.3(c),US-Offset Act(Byrd Amendment),para.69.

〔85〕张乃根.WTO争端解决的履行.武汉:武汉大学出版社,2008:180.

〔86〕“中国-影响部分出版物和音像娱乐产品的贸易权利和销售服务措施案”(简称“中美出版物案”)由于国内法律体制问题,比DSB裁定的合理期限晚了14个月执行裁决,而本案也成为中国到目前为止唯一一起没有在合理期限内全部完成WTO裁决的案件。

〔87〕Robert E.Hudec.The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies:A Developing Country Perspective.In Bernard Hoekman,Aaditya Mattoo.Philip English eds.Development,Trade,and the WTO:A Handbook.Washington DC:The World Bank,2002:84.

〔88〕Darrell Chichester.Battle of the Beef.International Law Review,2007(221),note 3.

〔89〕Naboth van den Broek.Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports:Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals.Journal of World Trade,2003,37:152.

〔90〕GAO's Report Page 5.See US Experience in Dispute Settlement System:the First Five Years,Available in the website www.gao.gov/new.items/n700202t.pdf(2019 4 30).

〔91〕转引自刘金质等编.国际政治大词典.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1994:31.

〔92〕Judith H.Bello.The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less is More.American Journal of International Law,1996(90):416.

〔93〕Congressional Digest,1994:270,转引自金灿荣.国会与美国贸易政策的制定.美国研究,2000(2):43.

〔94〕USTR's Report Page 10.See US Interests and Experience in the WTO Dispute Settlement System,Available in the website www.ustr.gov/speech_test/barshefsky/barshefskyt40.pdf(2019 4 30).

〔95〕Andrew T.Guzman.A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law.Cal.Law Review,2002:1848-1849.

〔96〕John H.Jackson.An Interview with John H.Jackson:Shaping International Economic Law.Journal of the International Institute,1997,54:60.

〔97〕John H.Jackson.Dispute Settlement and the WTO Emerging Problems.Journal of International Economic Law,1998,37:329.

〔98〕Rachel Brewster.Unpacking the State's Reputation.Harvard International Law Journal,2009,71:255.

〔99〕胡建国.美欧执行WTO裁决的比较分析——以国际法遵守为视角.欧洲研究,2014(1):74.

〔100〕Horn,Henrik and Petros C.Mavroidis.Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Country Interests.http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/BPdisput.PDF(2019 4 28).

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